Joe Napolitan's "100 things I have learned in 30 years as a political consultant"

In 1989, media maven David Garth gave me a dog-eared copy of Joseph Napolitan's legendary paper "100 things I have learned in 30 years as a political consultant". For David Garth to recommend somebody else's work was a great compliment, and in Napolitan's case, rightly so. Even now, more than twenty years later, his observations are still relevant and his insights often spot on. That's why, over the course of the coming months, I will publish Napolitan's lessons here as a tribute to this great man.

Lesson #1: strategy is the single most important factor in a political campaign

"This is the most important lesson I have learned in 30 years. The right strategy can survive a mediocre campaign, but even a brilliant campaign is likely to fail if the strategy is wrong. The strategy must be adapted to fit the campaign; you can't adapt the campaign to fit the strategy. Also this small but essential point: if you can't write it down, you don't have a strategy."

Lesson #2: there is no such thing as a bandwagon effect

"For years, in countries all over the world, including the United States, campaign workers have told me 'people like to be with a winner; they will vote for the candidate they think will win'. Thereupon they proceed to release to the press poll reports showing their candidate ahead, in the misguided expectation that this information will cause the voters to line up behind their candidate. If anything, I have found the reverse to be true: the supporters whose candidate is perceived as behind are motivated to work harder, while those of the candidate seen to be ahead tend to get overconfident and lazy. Perhaps the most glaring example of this syndrome I know of was in Venezuela in 1978, where the candidate of Accion Democratica, Luis Pinerua Ordaz, ran double-page newspaper ads for two weeks before the election with banner headlines reading: 'THE ELECTION IS OVER. PINERUA HAS WON'. Well, for Penerua the election was over: he lost. But the most interesting statistic was this: the turnout in that election was 5 percent lower than in the 1973 election, and the drop was greatest in areas of normal AD strength. Apparently Adecos believed their leader, so they stayed home. A costly lesson."

Lesson #3: the size of crowds bears little relationship to the vote

"Again, let me cite an example from Venezuela (where I am now working on my fourth consecutive election cycle): in one campaign the party I work for, Accion Democratica, held a rally in downtown Caracas. It was mobbed: more than 50.000 people turned out. Impressive. Two days later the Socialist Party, which never gets more than 5 percent of the vote, staged a rally on the same site -- with the same turnout. In 1968 I was director of media for Vice-President Hubert Humphrey in his campaign against Richard Nixon. One day Nixon toured Philadelphia; the crowds were enormous. Humphrey went through a few days later; the crowds were small. Humphrey won Philadelphia by 100.000 votes. The Republicans obviously did a better job in turning out the crowd but, at least in this case, not the vote".

Lesson #4: polls are essential but don't be fooled by them

"The only practical reason to take a political poll is to obtain information that will help you win the election. If the poll won't do that, you are better off spending your money on something else. Perhaps the least important information in a political poll is who is ahead at any given moment. Polls are not infallible, especially in primaries, or when they are taken before the campaign actually begins. I won't run a campaign without adequate polling -- but neither will I place total dependence on the polls. Nor will I make my polls public unless there is an unusual and extremely good reason for doing so".

Lesson #5: never underestimate the importance of a divided party

“Earlier this year I worked on the presidential election in the Dominican Republic for Jacobo Majluta, president of the Senate and candidate of the PRD, the same party as the president, who was not seeking re-election. The party was badly split by a primary struggle in which Majluta defeated José Fransisco Pena Gomez, mayor of Santo Domingo, friend and confidant of President Salvador Jorge Blanco. After a shaky start, Majluta’s campaign moved along nicely and I was confident we would win, and astonished when we lost to 78-year old, legally blind Joaquin Balaguer. (I have nothing against President Balaguer; personally, I like him, but I did not believe he was physically capable of being president). Our exit polls showed Majluta with 51 percent of the vote; reportedly Balaguer’s exit polls also showed Majluta with 51 percent of the vote (this was a three-way race). In the end, we lost by a couple of points. Later we learned that the intraparty rift was so fierce that President Jorge Blanco himself voted against his own party’s candidate for president, and many Pena Gomez supporters actively worked for Balaguer, the main opposition candidate. Our surveys did not detect this phenomenon. We underestimated the damage caused by divisions in the party. And it cost us dearly".

Lesson #6: don’t be afraid to bring in the real experts

“The sense of insecurity that exists among campaign managers and advisers should never be underestimated. For some reason, this seems to be particularly true in the Democratic Party in the United States. In several recent presidential elections, the advisors and workers who helped obtain the nomination for a particular candidate blocked out talented specialists from working in the general election, some of whom had worked for other candidates in the primary, some of whom had not worked for any primary candidate. It broke my heart in the 1984 presidential election to see all the talent on the sidelines not being used by the Democratic candidate – when he clearly needed all the help he could get. And this wasn’t the first time. If you have access to the skills of a Tony Schwartz of a Bob Squier or a David Garth and you don’t use them, you are making a mistake. If you win the election, everyone can be a hero. And if you lose, there is no glory for anyone. Use the best you can get and don’t worry about whose feelings may be hurt".

Lesson #7: most campaigns don’t know how to use consultants properly

"This seems absurd but it is true, and it is more true in foreign elections than it is in the United States. A few years ago I become so concerned about this that I wrote a paper ‘How to Use Political Consultants Effectively’, which I now distribute as a matter of course to any prospective client who inquires about my services. Most candidates and their managers really have litte idea about what a consultant does, or should do. You’ve got to make this clear to them at the beginning, so their expectations are neither exaggerated nor unrealistic."

Lesson #8: television spots showing large crowds are of little value; they just make the candidate feel good

"In one Latin American campaign, the advertising agency proudly showed me 22 spots they had produced for their candidate. At least 18 of them showed nothing but cheering crowds; not one of them showed the candidate talking to the people about what he would do for them if he were elected. We made the necessary adjustments in that campaign, but this phenomenon exists, and it sometimes is difficult to persuade inexperienced campaign workers that such spots really don’t help very much”.

  Lesson #9: timing is critical

“Timing is a critical part of overall strategy. Using an issue too early – or too late – can nullify its impact. Each situation is different. For a candidate who is not well known, an early media campaign can be essential. For a well-known candidate, early media may be wasteful. If your opponent makes an easily refutable charge, sometimes it is better to let him repeat it several times so that he will look silly when you counterattack. But sometimes it is essential to answer the charge immediately. It’s hard to teach timing. Much of it is instinctive. And in this era of computerized games, it’s nice to know that human judgment still plays a critical role in the campaign”.

 Lesson #10: how much money you have to spend is not as important as how you spend it

"While no one can deny it is comforting to have all the money you need to conduct your campaign, it’s not always the candidate with access to the largest amount of money who wins. There are many factors involved, of course, but certainly one of these is how effectively you spend the funds you do have available. It’s easy to squander money in a political campaign – and many candidates do so. And occasionally it is possible to drown an opponent in a sea of cash. But in most campaigns, assuming that each candidate has at least the minimum amount of money to mount a decent campaign, the likely winner is the one who spends his money best – or, put another way, succeeds in getting the biggest bangs for his bucks”.

Lesson #11: if something works, keep using it until it stops working

“I have been involved in several campaigns in which our opponents ran television spots we knew were hurting us, and then they inexplicably pulled them off the air. After one of these campaigns I asked a consultant to the opponent why this was done. He said they felt the spot had served its purpose, and they wanted to come on the air with new material. New isn’t necessarily better. Or, as they say, if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”. 

Lesson #12: make sure the message is clear and understandable

“Part of an overall strategy involves defining the right message or messages to be communicated to specific target groups, or the electorate as a whole. Whatever the message is, it should be clear and easily understood by everyone. The classic example is Ronald Reagan’s message in the 1980 presidential campaign: ‘I will make America strong and lower taxes’. Nothing could be clearer – or more effective. If Jimmy Carter had a message in that campaign, no one has yet figured out what it was."

Lesson #13: never underestimate the intelligence of the voters, nor overestimate the amount of knowledge at their disposal

“The electorate is not stupid. But often it does not have sufficient information at its disposal to make right (i.e., favorable to your candidate) decisions. It’s not their responsibility to go out and get this information; it is your responsibility to serve it up to them, on a silver platter if necessary. If, at the end of a campaign, the voters still don’t understand what your candidate is trying to tell them, that’s the candidate’s fault – not the voters’. No longer am I surprised at the sophistication shown by the voters in response to survey research questions, but I occasionally still am astonished by the lack of sophistication on the part of the candidate, and often that of his staff".  

Lesson #14: negative attacks are better handled by third parties in paid media

"This is not the place to discuss the merits or demerits, the morality or immorality, of negative attacks on an opponent. Personally, I follow a simple rule: the candidate’s public record is fair game for attack, his private life is not. But negative attacks are a fact of political life, and if you are going to use them, you might as well use them as effectively as you can. I prefer never to have my candidate attack his opponent in paid television or radio spots; I prefer always to have my candidate emerge as the ‘nice guy’ on television. When you feel an attack is justified, then let the negative message be carried by an announcer, or the copy in a print ad, or by someone else other than your candidate”. 

Lesson #15: don’t underestimate the power and penetration of radio

“I’ve been singing this song for a long time but some people don’t want to tune in. Granted, television may be the most emotional and persuasive of all the media – but radio is a close second, and has several advantages over television: it is less expensive to produce, it can be produced quickly, it can be targeted more effectively than television, it costs less to put on the air. Anyone who has any doubts about the power of radio should sit in Tony Schwartz’s office for an hour some day and listen to some of the spots he has prepared for candidates and causes. That will make a convert out of you. To me, one of the worst – and laziest – things you can do in a campaign is run the sound track of a television spot as a radio spot. That’s as bad as running the same copy in a television ad and a print ad. They are different mediums. I’ve seen candidates spend $150.000 or more on television production in a campaign, and then scream murder if they are asked to approve a $25.000 budget for radio production. Actually, there are more good television producers around than good radio producers – but just because someone can produce a decent television spot doesn’t automatically mean he can produce effective radio. And they prove it all the time”.

 Lesson #16: don’t underestimate the impact of an unpopular national administration

“This is another one of those hidden obstacles, like trying to measure the impact of a divided party. I also believe this phenomenon is more important in presidential elections than in any other. Assuming the merits of the candidates are about equal, if one represents the party of an unpopular administration, he’ll probably lose. This is a condition to factor into your equation when you are trying to determine the attitudes of voters”.

Lesson #17: perception is more important than reality

“You don’t have to be in this business very long before you learn this fact. If the voters think Candidate X is an honest man, he can steal the gold leaf off the state house dome and get away with it; if they think Candidate B is a crook, he can have four cardinals and 16 bishops attest to his honesty, and people will still think he is a crook. The best living example of this (and maybe the best in all of history) is Ronald Reagan: he has American voters (a majority of them anyway) convinced he is protecting their money with a tight fist, while in reality the deficits his government has incurred are staggering almost beyond imagination. And while Reagan is mortgaging the farm, he’s also accusing Democrats of being the big spenders – and getting away with it! Astonishing, frustrating (if you are a Democrat), and true. You take reality; Ill take perception any day." 

Lesson #18: running a campaign is not a democratic process

 "It's more like a military operation -- at least if it is done right. All voices should not be equal in campaign discussions and decisions. A campaign should have experts and specialists in various areas. Their opinions should carry weight. If you need an operation, you should pay more attention to the surgeon's opinion than that of the ambulance driver: if you need to get to the hospital in a hurry, than take the ambulance driver's advice. I remember working in the re-election campaign of a governor, who shall be nameless here, who, when major decisions in a campaign needed to be made, would ask six or eight of his top advisors what they thought, and then turn to his driver, an ex-convict, and ask him what he thought. Democratic but hardly effective. The ultimate responsibility for making campaign decisions should rest with the campaign manager. If he wants to talk to the candidate about these decisions, fine. If he wants to accept a consensus from his staff, fine. But he certainly shouldn't make his decisions on the basis of one-person, one-vote."

Lesson #19: make sure your candidate understands the issues

“Those outside our business would consider this a simplistic statement; those in it know what I am talking about. Never mind the extreme cases, like the candidate for the United States Senate who once asked me ‘what is this détente business anyway?’, just consider the run-of-the-mill candidate who doesn’t do his homework. Earlier this year a television station in Maryland embarrassed some candidates for the United States Senate by asking them some simple questions on foreign and domestic policy. If it had been an examination in high school civics class, they all would have failed. And it’s bad enough when the candidate isn’t informed about the other guy’s issues: what is really bad is when he isn’t informed about his own issues. It happens."

Lesson #20: don’t complicate the campaign

“In a book I wrote in 1972 called ‘The Election Game and How to Win It’, I said there were three simple steps to winning any campaign:

(1) Decide what you are going to say.

(2) Decide how you are going to say it.

(3) Say it.

I’ve been in campaigns with so many committees, sub-committees, liaison committees, special interest directors, colonels, captains, lieutenants and sub-lieutenants you have trouble finding directions to the men’s room, never mind trying to get some clear picture of what is going on. Being a campaign manager or consultant in a major campaign is like being a professional football coach: you may know 1000 different plays, but you know you can only use about 25 of them in any given game. I’ve seen campaign managers waste a lot of money on silly things – like expensive newsletters that are mailed mainly to supporters and campaign workers – only to wind up with insufficient funds to pay for an adequate media campaign. Everything should be as clear and uncomplicated as you can make it, from the table of organization to the graphics on the letterhead”.

Lesson #21: don’t get hung up on slogans and logos

“I like Tony Schwartz’ reasoning here: ‘If it works for a particular spot, use it. If it doesn’t, don’t’. Too often a candidate or his advertising manager or agent will get so hung up on a slogan or a logo – and they may be perfectly good slogans or logos – that they will insist they be used in every television spot, every radio spot, every brochure, every print ad, etc. Use them when they work, and if they seem out of place, use something else. Or nothing at all”.

Lesson #22: protect home base first

“If you have a strong base of support, protect that first, then go after other voters. It also is easier to increase the percentage of your vote in a favorable environment than to get an equal number of votes in a hostile environment. Don’t take your base for granted”.

Lesson #23: don’t be afraid to invade opposition territory

“This may seem to contradict the previous point but it doesn’t: first you protect home base, then you invade opposition territory. We often run into candidates who won’t speak before certain audiences because ‘they’re all Republicans’ (I’m sure Republican consultants run into the same problem with Republican candidates). I try to explain to my reluctant candidate why he should talk to those groups in simple terms, like this: ‘If you speak to 100 Democrats, and you have all their votes before you go in, all you can do, at best, is hold your own, and you may lose some. If you talk to 100 Republicans who start off being opposed to you, you can’t lose any votes – and you just might gain some’. That’s why I advise white candidates to go into black neighborhoods, black candidates to go into white neighborhoods, rich candidates to go into poor neighborhoods, city slickers to go down to the farm”.

Lesson #24: what you say in Peoria can be heard in Pasadena

"Candidates sometimes have a peculiarly anachronistic idea that once they are out of their home town or district or state they can get away with saying things they wouldn't say at home, forgetting (I guess) about such things as instant communication. My favorite example of this is hoary with age; it goes all the way back to 1962, when I was doing Endicott Peabody's campaign for governor against the incumbent governor of Massachusetts, John Volpe. Governor Volpe, a competent man who later went on to serve in the Nixon cabinet, made a speech in Portland, Oregon, in which he said he was opposed to the medicare program proposed by President Kennedy. Not surprisingly, we heard about it in Boston. This was only a few days before the election. I churned out an instant brochure with this message: 'Governor Volpe is opposed to President Kennedy's medicare program. Endicott Peabody is in favor of it'. We mailed this brochure to every voter in Massachusetts over the age of 60; many received their brochures the day before the election. Peabody won the election by less than 3500 votes out of almost 2.5 million votes cast. I can't believe that Volpe's gaffe on the West Coast didn't have something to do with his defeat".

Lesson #25: let your candidate talk to the people

"In this era of 'creative' television commercials, there is a tendency to make a whole package of spots in which the candidate never once talks directly to the people. This is a mistake. The people want to see and hear the candidate. Maybe he doesn't look like Robert Redford or speak like Ronald Reagan; they still want to see him, hear him, get a feel for him. I think those of us in the consulting business sometimes make the mistake of always assuming we know more than the candidate. This isn't true, and the longer I stay in the business, the more convinced I am that the eyeball-to-eyeball ('face to camera', as they say in Great Britain) spot can be one of the most effective weapons in our arsenal".

Lesson #26: every campaign is different; every campaign is the same

“The object of any political campaign is to persuade voters to mark their ‘X’ after one name instead of another. In every campaign, certain basics are similar if not identical. Every campaign contains the same essential ingredients: polls, strategy, message, advertising, organization, fund raising. But each campaign has its points of dissimilarity, and the approach and strategy must be defined and adapted to conform with existing elements. Just as generals often are accused of fighting the last war, we should never let ourselves try to ‘fight the last campaign’, but adjust our tactics to meet current needs”.

Lesson #27: try not to self-destruct

“It’s astonishing how often this simple rule is broken. While I concede other factors were involved, I also am convinced that Walter Mondale lost whatever chance he might have had to win the U.S. presidency in 1984 in his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention when he announced that if he were elected he would raise taxes. There may be an example, somewhere, sometime, of a candidate winning an election on a promise to raise taxes; I don’t happen to know who or when or where. I cite Mondale only because the example is recent and glaring; candidates manage to shoot themselves in the foot with astonishing regularity”.

Lesson #28: don’t let your opponent have a free ride

“While I am not a great proponent of the negative campaign, neither can I be considered a ‘turn the other cheek’ consultant. Too often I see, or work for, candidates who refuse to answer an opponent’s charges, refuse to refute reckless accusations made against him, don’t want to ‘dignify’ the opponent by replying to his remarks. If your candidate has a solid lead, and you are confident your campaign plan is so well designed it can compensate for these charges, or if you frequently research the opponent’s charges and find they are having no impact at all, then maybe, maybe, you can get away with letting your opponent have a free ride. But I’d advise against it. A candidate is sometimes reluctant to answer an opponent’s charges because he feels he has to answer them himself, and he ‘doesn’t want to get down in the gutter with that guy’. Noble sentiments that not infrequently lead to the loss of an election. The candidate doesn’t have to refute each and every charge personally, but the campaign should do so. Otherwise you run the risk that the unrefuted statement, often repeated, will be perceived as the truth, and then you can be in real trouble. Also, you should never underestimate the cumulative damage such unanswered charges can cause”.

Lesson #29: start early

"You can never start planning your campaign too early. You can begin the campaign too soon; that's something else again. In my own experience, the best example I know of long planning period/short campaign was Mike Gravel's upset victory over Senator Ernest Gruening in the 1968 Democratic primary for United States Senator in Alaska. We planned Gravel's campaign in December, 1966; the execution of the campaign, pretty much according to what we had decided to do 18 months later, occurred during two weeks in August, 1968. By starting early you have plenty of time to take and analyze polls, study your opponent and his likely moves in depth, design and discuss various possible strategies, select the best specialists to work on the campaign, and mentally prepare your candidate. When you start late, it doesn't mean that you have fewer things to do, but merely less time to do them". 

Lesson #30: you may be able to polish a candidate but you can't really change him

"I've seen candidates who have improved (and some who have gotten worse) in the course of campaigning, but I've never been involved with a candidate who really changed very much. Sure, you can do some cosmetic things: convince him to wear dark suits, cut his hair differently, change the color of his socks, buy more attractive eyeglasses, maybe even get him to be more prompt. But, almost all the time, you've really got to work with what you have, so you may as well adjust to this at the beginning of the campaign, and adapt your campaign plan to fit your candidate, just as a football coach adapts his strategy to fit his players, because he can't make his players do things they are not capable of doing". 

Lesson #31: latch on to existing organizations

“Creating an organization can be a formidable task. There are consultants – Matt Reese may be the best – who have made a career out of creating ‘instant organizations’. But this can be expensive and difficult. Whenever possible, I have found it is much better to latch on to an existing organization, whether this happens to be a political party or some sort of special interest support group. Organizations which share the candidate’s views on highly emotional subjects, such as abortion, gun control and nuclear freeze, can be of great organizational assistance to the campaign. At the very least, they can provide useful mailing lists; at best, they can provide bodies, experience and sometimes even money”.

Lesson #32: try to instill some sense of priority in your candidate

“Rationally and logically, every candidate knows that just about every appearance he makes on television, especially in paid commercials purchased in prime time, will be seen by more voters than will see him in person during the entire course of the campaign. But virtually every candidate resists spending the time necessary to permit the best possible television production. They think nothing of spending several hours with a group of 100 voters, most of whom are already committed, but asking them to spend the same amount of time for production of a television spot that will be seen by hundreds of thousands of voters invariably creates resistance. This is why it is so important to have as the campaign scheduler someone who understands the importance of various activities, such as media production, and who will cancel a breakfast with 50 supporters so the candidate can have more time to prepare for television or rehearse an important speech or take a day’s rest or discuss critical strategy decisions. Years ago it used to annoy me to go into a campaign as a consultant, relatively highly paid in terms of the campaign budget, and sit around idly while the candidate met with groups he could see at any time. Now it just amuses me, but it’s still a waste”.

Lesson #33: when you use new technologies, make sure you bring in specialists

“It’s not enough to buy or rent a couple of computers and hire a kid who has taken a course in computer programming and then believe you have ‘computerized’ your campaign. It’s like going out and buying an expensive video production unit without knowing how to run it properly. If your campaign calls for any sort of sophisticated equipment or procedures, make certain you hire specialists who really do know how to operate that equipment or execute those procedures. I have a degree of familiarity with how computers can be used effectively in political campaigns; it would never occur to me to try to run a computer operation because I don’t possess the technical skills that are required”.

Lesson #34: endorsements are fine but you’ve got to use them properly

“Popularity is not easily transferable. If the most popular political figure in the district (or in the state or in the country) endorses your candidate, this doesn’t necessarily mean all his voters are going to vote for your candidate. Used carefully and selectively, endorsements can be extremely helpful. Just this year I was involved in a campaign where our opponent claimed my candidate was supported only by the political bosses, so our first wave of television spots consisted of man-on-the-street interviews of average, ordinary people saying good things about my candidate. If a candidate is thought to be an intellectual lightweight, get some heavy thinkers to endorse his candidacy and talk about his intelligence; if he is perceived to lack minority support, get some blacks and Hispanics or whatever the minority groups are in the district to endorse him in commercials. Endorsements and testimonials are a method of increasing the candidate’s credibility among certain groups of voters. Used effectively, they can be helpful, but don’t expect too much of them. I’m not much for the ‘celebrity endorsement’, but there are occasions when great testimonials can be given by non-political people who might say ‘I’ve never publicly endorsed a political candidate before, but let me tell you why in this election I’m supporting Joe Jones…’”.

Lesson #35: don’t create exaggerated expectations – especially if you are likely to win

“This is particularly true in gubernatorial or presidential elections in which your candidate has a good chance of winning, and hopes eventually to run for re-election. If you promise more than you can deliver, this will cost you at the next election. If the people forget what you’ve promised (and some of them are sure to remember), you can be certain your opponent next time around will remind them. Better to be more modest in what is promised, and to set goals you have a reasonable chance of achieving. Also, sometimes the promise is so exaggerated it simply doesn’t ring true and damages a candidate’s credibility”.

Lesson #36: proceed cautiously in foreign elections

“First, because you are a foreigner, there will be natural skepticism about your ability, or understanding of the problems. If you are an American, these problems usually are compounded. A good friend of mine, who shall remain nameless because I want him to remain a good friend, used to drive me to distraction in early discussions with presidential candidates in foreign countries. After one two-hour meeting, he was prepared to design the whole campaign, tell the locals what they were doing wrong, and give some very simple solutions to extremely complicated problems. Some of the time his analysis was right on the mark, but its effectiveness was dissipated by the speed in which his recommendations were make. The first objective in dealing with candidates and their staffs in foreign countries is to win their confidence. Ideas they might reject out of hand if offered in the first meeting might well be accepted, or at least seriously considered, after they have developed some confidence in you. Proceed slowly and cautiously, even if you know right from the beginning what needs to be done”.

Lesson #37: always let the campaign staff know you aren't looking for their job

"When I used to do a lot of campaigns in the United States, invariably in my first meeting with the candidate's staff I have a little speech about my role in the campaign. I explained that I had no interest in being the governor's chief of staff or press secretary or head of the state lottery; all I wanted to do was help win the election and go home. I wanted them to look upon me as a resource, a support system, not a threat. Usually this worked, but not always; I know that in some campaigns some staff members, invariaby those least secure about their own abilities, tried to undercut my recommendations. Not much you can do about this; it's an occupational hazard. But if you make the effort at the beginning to win the cooperation of the candidate's staff, and assure them your role ends on election day, no matter what the outcome, then it's usually an easier campaign". 

Lesson #38: if your advice isn't being accepted, quit

"I realize this is easy advice for a financially-secure, older consultant to give, but it's a dictum I followed in earlier, leaner years. If your advice is being constantly overruled or ignored, you have two choices: give in or get out. I always preferred to get out -- not that it happened all that often, maybe three or four times in 30 years. Once I was retained as media consultant in a New York state gubernatorial primary. The candidate was a good guy but frustrating to work for. One afternoon the representative of the advertising agency hired by the campaign and I had a cup of coffee that turned into a mutual complaint session. By the time we finished our second cup of coffee, we both agreed to quit. We felt a lot better; the candidate lost. Maybe he would have lost anyway; who knows? What I usually tell the candidate and/or his campaign managers in situations like that is: ':ook, you are telling people I am the media director in this campaign, but I'm really not, because you are not accepting my recommendations. You are paying me money for advice you aren't using, and I'm spending my time working in a campaign where my advice obviously isn't needed or wanted. Why don't we part company and stay friends?'" 

Lesson #39: get your financial arrangements settled at the beginning

"Get your financial arrangements settled at the beginning, it’s better not to do a campaign than to do it and not get paid for it. You learn as you get older. Early in my career, after meeting with the candidate and his team, I’d often design what amounted to a whole campaign plan and submit that with my proposal to work for the candidate. Until I got smarter, they'd often reject the proposal for what- ever reason, and then use the campaign plan pretty much as I had written it. Now I don’t write a plan until we have agreed on a contract. There are certain expenses built into my fees. For example, first class air fare. When you make 40 trips out of the country in a single year, as I have done, it's not just a question of comfort, it’s a question of survival. If any campaign asks me to fly coach, I usually tell them that if they can't afford first class airplane tickets, they probably can’t afford my services anyway. Unless I know the candidate well, or have worked for him before, I now insist on quarterly payments in advance. This is particularly important overseas, where you have essentially no recourse if a candidate or party refuses to pay for your services. I’m perfectly willing to do campaigns for nothing, or for a token fee, if the candidate is a good friend, or if it’s a cause or candidate I really believe in and want to work for. But if we are talking about a business arrangement, it should be conducted on a businesslike basis and that means being paid on schedule. I have absolutely no sympathy for candidates, especially those with great personal wealth, who expect consultants or technicians to wait for payments, or to cut their fees. The surest way to avoid problems is to get a chunk of money up front at least that way you can’t get hurt too badly if the second payment never comes. This is even more important for people like television producers, who need to invest substantial amounts of money in production costs. In my business, when I used to work without advance payment, if I didn’t get paid, I was usually out only some time and travel expenses. In honesty, I must say that more than 90 per cent of the political candidates I have worked for have paid me in full. A few didn’t, and their names are etched in my memory".

Lesson #40: take nothing for granted

"This is critical advice, even if it is almost impossible to follow, because at times you simply must rely on the information provided by others in the campaign. In a recent presidential election, we got burned badly in the rural areas of a country, even though I had been assured ‘everything is fine' in those areas. If you are suspicious something may not be as it seems, or as it should be, try to run an independent check. This might mean a flash poll using a different pollster in an area you have doubts about. If you are told money is ‘no problem' but you know suppliers and producers haven’t been paid, ask to see the books. (In fact, whenever anyone tells me something ‘is no problem’, I begin to get suspicious.) If you keep asking enough questions, usually you can satisfy yourself that the matter you are concerned about is actually under control, or it isn’t. If it isn’t, just hope there’s enough time left before the election to do something about it."

Lesson #41: if you make a mistake, don’t be afraid to admit it and try something else

"There are few perfect campaigns. Inevitably, mistakes will occur. Usually, in the overall context of a long campaign, a few mistakes won’t hurt much -- unless you compound then by continuing to repeat them. In a presidential campaign I was involved this year, a television producer made several spots for the candidate I later became involved with. The spots generated a howl of protest from supporters of the candidate, who claimed they would withdraw their support if the spots continued to run. Faced with this, the producer became stubborn, said it would take awhile for the message of the spots to sink in, and urged they be run for at least two weeks. The campaign manager wisely decided to withdraw them immediately, supporters quieted down, and the candidate eventually won. Earlier in this paper I suggested 'lf it ain’t broke, don't fix it it.’ The opposite is true as well: ‘If it is broke, fix it'. Sometimes candidates, managers and consultants would rather proceed with a harmful policy rather than admit they are wrong and make changes. Everybody makes mistakes; the smart ones correct them."

Lesson #42: research your candidate as thoroughly as you do your opponent

"In almost every campaign, an individual or team is assigned to research the opponent’s record, in the hope of uncovering some things that can be used against him. In my campaigns, I insist we make the same kind of effort researching our own candidate. If we don’t, the opponent surely will, and if there is anything in the candidate’s background or record we will need to defend in a campaign, I want to know it sooner rather than later. Maybe the opponent’s researchers never will find out about it; more likely they will. Better to be prepared. I always try to have a private meeting with a new candidate to ask him if there is anything on his record that could prove embarrassing later in the campaign. Sometimes candidates tell you the truth; sometimes they don’t.

My favorite story here concerns a southern candidate for governor, a free-wheeling bachelor. When I asked him the question, this conversation ensued:

‘Joe, do you know what they say about me down here?’

- ‘No. What do they say?'

'They say I drink whiskey and chase women.’

- ‘Do you?’

‘Of course I do.’

How can you hate a guy like that?"

Lesson # 43: marginal improvements are important -- and often decisive.

"I read a fascinating book this year which I strongly recommend to everyone in this business.  It is titled ‘Thinking in Time,’ by Richard Neustadt and Ernest May. One of the points they make is that ‘marginal improvements are important.’ While the authors weren’t referring to political campaigns, their advice is right on target. When you start a campaign with your candidate 30 or 40 points behind, there is no way you are going to make up this deficit in one gulp. You must chip away, make marginal improvements, over a period of time. But even more important, most elections are decided by close margins, and if you can make small improvements with every group of voters, these will add up."

Lesson # 44: know when to use bold strokes and when not to.

"There are times when a bold stroke Is necessary to put some zip in your campaign. Usually, you can use a bold stroke if:

-- Your campaign is drifting and needs a spark.

-- You are in with the pack in a multicandidate race and need to pull out of the pack.

-- You are behind and conventional tactics aren’t getting you anywhere.

However, by definition, a bold stroke can be dangerous and has the potential to backfire or be counterproductive. As a general rule, I recommend a bold stroke only when it appears nothing else will pull you out of a rut. But if you are ahead, the Polls are steady and favorable, your strategy is sound and working, then there is no need for any bold strokes. If they backfire, it could cost you the election. Knowing when to use a bold stroke is as important as knowing how to use one."

Lesson # 45: the little things often are important.

"Numbers like billions and trillions of dollars are meaningless to most people. In order to reach then, you’ve got to relate to their level of understanding. For example, there was little complaint on the part of the American public about the country’s bloated military budget because few people could even visualize the numbers. But when it was revealed the Air Force was paying $700 for a toilet seat, or $125 for a hammer you could buy in a hardware store for five bucks, then people became aroused, because they could understand and relate to the situation in their own terms. Sherman Adams, President Eisenhower’s chief of staff and a respected former governor of New Hampshire, ran an effective White House and was one of the most powerful men in the government, but he was forced to resign, and the credibility of the presidency was damaged, because he accepted a vicuna coat from a Boston financier, a coat worth maybe $200 at the time. So when you are looking for weak spots in your opponent, don’t always jump on the big things; the little ones could prove to be much more important in turning the campaign."

Lesson # 46: Don’t let your candidate think that just because he has said something once everyone has heard it

"In the first place, to be a candidate, you must have a sizeable ego. Part of that ego is the belief that because you make a statement or a speech, the whole state (county, world, universe, etc) knows what you said and what your position is. I once had the president of a Third World country tell me that his people could recite his speeches by heart, that they all listened to his talks on television, that they all were familiar with his programs.

‘Fine,' I said, ‘let’s take a poll.'

The poll showed not many people watched the television programs, those who did usually had little idea of what the president was talking about, and they had no idea at all about what he was doing. We made some changes. It’s not only in the Third World that candidates or heads of state have these attitudes; they are prevalent wherever I’ve worked. If your candidate says something good or important, repeat it and repeat it until the message sinks in. Don’t depend on a speech or news coverage to carry important campaign messages; reinforce them with paid advertising."

Erik van Bruggen belt terwijl ik al in de auto zit op weg naar Amsterdam. "Hij komt 'm zelf ophalen", roept Erik vertwijfeld door de telefoon. "Hij" is Geert Wilders, aanvoerder van de PVV. Eerder die dag heeft een vakjury bestaande uit Erik van Bruggen, Jack de Vries, Hans Anker, Jan Driessen en ondergetekende de PVV gekroond als winnaar van de BKB Campagne Award, de prijs voor de beste verkiezingscampagne van 2011. Een prijs die we later die avond -- dinsdag 1 maart -- zullen uitreiken tijdens het "Feest van de Democratie", de verkiezingsbijeenkomst van BKB in de Melkweg. 

Even nog hadden we overwogen de prijs dit jaar helemaal niet uit te keren, vanwege het abominabele niveau van de campagnes. De jury was over het algemeen niet onder de indruk van de gevoerde campagnes voor de Provinciale Statenverkiezingen. Het is de politieke partijen immers niet gelukt om nieuwe thema’s op de agenda te plaatsen. De jury had vergeefs gezocht naar slimme interventies die grote electorale verschuivingen hebben veroorzaakt. Dit was deels het gevolg van de lage status van de verkiezingen (zogenaamde second order elections), wat onder meer tot gevolg had dat de campagnestaven over veel minder middelen konden beschikken dan bij Tweede Kamerverkiezingen. Voorts speelde een rol dat de verkiezingen tegelijkertijd gingen over de samenstelling van de Provinciale Staten en de Eerste Kamer. Landelijke en regionale problemen en kandidaten liepen daardoor in de campagne voortdurend door elkaar heen.

Uiteindelijk hebben we toch drie partijen gekozen die boven de anderen uitstegen. Op de derde plaats selecteerden we de nieuwe partij 50+ van Jan Nagel. We vonden dat deze partij er in korte tijd in was geslaagd in alle kiesdistricten aan de verkiezingen mee te kunnen doen. Dankzij slim geregisseerde momenten wist de partij ook herhaaldelijk de aandacht te trekken in de landelijke media. De tweede plaats was voor de SP, wiens campagnemachine ervoor zorgde dat de partij met name lokaal goed zichtbaar was, en in de televisiedebatten en online haar punten met voorbereide oneliners goed naar voren wist te brengen.

De jury was unaniem van mening dat de eerste plaats, en de BKB Campagne Award 2011, toebehoorde aan de PVV. De partij had nadrukkelijk geïnvesteerd in de relevante doelgroep van oudere kiezers. Deze groep onderscheidt zich door hun trouwe stembusgang. Deze strategische keuze van de PVV heeft vorm gekregen in slim gekozen (media)optredens van landelijk partijleider Geert Wilders. Misschien wel de belangrijkste verdienste van de PVV-campagne is dat deze zich gaandeweg een in verkiezingen benijdenswaardige positie heeft weten te verwerven: die van recensent. Vanuit die recenserende rol heeft Wilders zijn gedoogpartners de maat genomen en opgeroepen om in actie te komen. Het uiteindelijke beeld was dat VVD en CDA moesten volgen.

So far so good. Contact was opgenomen met de PVV om ze te feliciteren met het resultaat, hun te vragen het nieuws nog even geheim te houden tot 20:30 uur die avond, en iemand naar Amsterdam te sturen om de award in ontvangst te nemen. Een uurtje later kreeg Erik van Bruggen zijn antwoord: niks afgevaardigde, Geert Wilders komt de award zelf wel even ophalen in de Melkweg, het hol van de leeuw. Daar hadden we -- eerlijk gezegd -- niet helemaal op gerekend. Na mijn aankomst in Amsterdam volgt er snel overleg met Erik van Bruggen, Hans Anker, Jan Driessen en Jack de Vries. Wat kunnen we verwachten? Hoe zal de zaal reageren? Wat doen we als de pleuris uitbreekt? Wilders meets de grachtengordel is immers een meeting van uitersten.

Uiteindelijk besluiten we ons verder niet al te druk te maken. Wilders had de prijs immers eerlijk verdiend, en het getuigde van respect dat hij hem ook zelf op kwam halen in het hol van de leeuw. En dus nam de jury om 20:00 uur plechtig plaats op het podium van de oude zaal in de Melkweg, gadegeslagen door een overwegend jong en links publiek, dat de uitslag nog niet kende en al helemaal niet wist dat hun verpersoonlijking van al het rechtse kwaad zich ondertussen stiekem stond te verkneukelen achter het gordijn.

Dat er iets stond te gebeuren was wel duidelijk. Een half uur geleden was opeens een armada van politie verschenen die met dranghekken de Melkweg hermetisch had afgesloten van de buitenwereld. Potige mannen met kortgeschoren haren en oortjes liepen streng kijkend af en aan. Opvallend veel journalisten en fotografen voerden vlak voor het podium onderling strijd voor het beste plekje. Vervolgens was het de beurt aan de jury om de winnaar bekend te maken. Jack de Vries deed zijn uiterste best de bekendmaking zo lang mogelijk te rekken, tot uiteindelijk het hoge woord eruit kwam: "En de winnaar is: de PVV".

Het gordijn ging opzij, en daar kwam Geert Wilders zelfverzekerd het hol van de leeuw binnen stappen. Het publiek was helemaal uit het lood geslagen van deze onverwachte verschijning. Jack de Vries deed een uitstekend impromtu vraaggesprek met de PVV voorman, die de lachers al snel op zijn hand kreeg door te stellen dat hij erg blij was met "het eerste teken van erkenning vanuit de grachtengordel". Het meest verrassende aspect was de reactie van het publiek in de zaal. Of beter gezegd: het gebrek aan reactie. Overwegend jong en links, goed opgeleid, niet bepaald op hun mondjes gevallen. Maar in het plotselinge bijzijn van Geert wisten ze opeens niet goed wat ze moesten doen. De eerste oproep tot vragen uit de zaal was in eerste instantie aan dovenmansoren gericht, tot er eindelijk een dappere jongere te vinden bleek die het ijs begon te breken.

En zo ontstond het eerste, voorzichtige gesprek tussen Geert Wilders en de Amsterdamse grachtengordel. Twee uitersten die in eerste instantie niet zo goed wisten wat ze met elkaar aanmoesten. Maar ook twee uitersten die naarmate het gesprek vorderde moesten erkennen dat beeldvorming altijd extremer is dan de realiteit. De aanwezigen hadden ondanks forse politieke meningsverschillen toch respect voor Wilders dat hij zich in het hol van de leeuw begaf, en Geert Wilders betaalde dat respect dubbel en dwars terug door de tijd te nemen en in gesprek te gaan met het publiek, en hun vragen open en eerlijk te beantwoorden.

Wilders was na afloop oprecht blij met het resultaat. Hij vertelde eerlijk dat hij van te voren niet wist wat hij kon verwachten, en had gezien de lokatie (Melkweg Amsterdam) en het publiek rekening gehouden met een vijandige ontvangst. Het feit dat hij in het hol van de leeuw respectvol was ontvangen en in staat was geweest de dialoog aan te gaan met een heel ander kiezerspubliek dan hij gewend is, was hem zichtbaar positief bevallen. Grote politieke verschillen tussen Wilders en de grachtengordel zijn op dinsdag 1 maart niet overbrugd. Maar beide partijen zijn door deze ervaring wel allebei een stapje dichterbij elkaar gekomen. En dat heet vooruitgang.

Vandaag over een week zijn de verkiezingen voor de Provinciale Staten, door de meeste politici benoemd als de belangrijkste lokale verkiezingen in jaren. Immers, de toekomst van het kabinet Rutte staat op het spel. Indien de combinatie VVD, CDA en PVV niet minimaal 38 zetels behaalt, wordt het kabinet een speelbal van de nieuwe, vijandige en sterk gepolitiseerde Senaat. De kans is zelfs aanwezig dat het kabinet bij een dergelijk scenario zal moeten aftreden.

Belangen genoeg, zou je zeggen, voor zowel de coalitie als de oppositie. Maar in de tot nu toe gevoerde verkiezingscampagnes is dat belang nauwelijks terug te vinden. Ik vraag me werkelijk af wat de campagnestrategen dit jaar heeft bezield. De stilte op het campagnefront is oorverdovend, en het totale gebrek aan strategie onbegrijpelijk.

Ik kan de tegenwerpingen uit de verschillende campagneorganisaties reeds voorspellen: “rustig maar, meneer van de Linde, de kiezer beslist pas in de laatste week en wij zorgen ervoor dat onze kandidaten die week in alle programma’s zitten”. Maar campagnestrategen die in die tegeltjeswijsheid geloven, missen de gouden regel van het campagnevoeren: de referendumvraag.

Iedere succesvolle campagne onderscheidt zich door zes tot acht weken voor de verkiezingen alles op alles te zetten om een afgebakend thema en/of karaktereigenschap op de maatschappelijke agenda te zetten, wat als referendum moet gaan dienen voor de verkiezingsdag. Talloze verkiezingsonderzoeken hebben immers uitgewezen dat de kiezer zijn of haar uiteindelijk stem mede bepaalt door waar hij of zij zich zorgen over maakt op het cruciale moment dat hij of zij in het stemhokje staat. En die keuze kan drastisch verschillen afhankelijk van waar die kiezer zich op dat moment zorgen over maakt. Is het de economie? Veiligheid? De Islam? Onderwijs? Oorlog? Vrede? Ervaring?

Die zorg – dat thema – noemen we in campagne lingo het ‘referendum’. Het is de primaire taak van iedere campagneorganisatie om de campagne te beginnen met de hamvraag: welk thema, en/of welke karaktereigenschap moet in de komende campagne centraal komen te staan om onze partij de grootste kans te geven op winst? Waar moet de kiezer op dat cruciale moment in dat stemhokje aan denken om de keuze op ons te laten vallen, en niet op de tegenstander? Op welk terrein, en op welk onderwerp, zijn wij (veel) sterker dan alle andere partijen?

In 1992 was dat voor Bill Clinton: de economie (“It’s the economy, stupid!”); in 1993 was dat voor Rudy Giuliani: veiligheid; in 2002 was dat voor Fortuyn: (de puinhopen van) Paars; in 2008 was dat voor Obama: hoop; in 2010 was dat voor Geert Wilders: de Islam; en voor de VVD: de economie.

Vervolgens is de tweede stap in je campagnestrategie: zorgen dat jouw thema ook daadwerkelijk een referendum wordt door er een brede maatschappelijke discussie over te gaan voeren. En dat doe je niet een week voor de verkiezingen, maar maanden. Door het thema te ontleden in hapklare brokken, het glashelder te onderscheiden van alle andere partijen waarmee je in gevecht bent, en te zorgen dat jouw thema dag in, dag uit onderwerp van gesprek is in alle media.

Met name Geert Wilders is wat dit betreft een uitstekend voorbeeld: wat je ook van hem mag vinden, hij is er uitstekend in geslaagd zijn kernthema – de Islam en alles wat daarbij komt kijken -- breed op de maatschappelijke agenda te krijgen. Het gaat in alle media vrijwel altijd en overal over Geert Wilders en zijn kernthema, zelfs als hij zelf niet in de programma’s zit. Dat doet hij razend knap.

Pas als je erin bent geslaagd jouw thema mediabreed een onderdeel te maken van het maatschappelijke debat, wordt het tijd voor de conversie. En die periode bestrijkt historisch de laatste twee weken – en met name het laatste weekeinde -- voor de verkiezingen. Als het goed is staat jouw thema dan op de agenda, en is het nu zaak om met concrete oplossingen te komen voor hoe jouw partij dat probleem gaat aanpakken.

En zo zijn we bij het fundamentele probleem aangeland van de huidige verkiezingen: alle partijen hebben stap één en twee overgeslagen, en denken nu in de laatste week met stap drie wel even hun slag te kunnen slaan. Welnu, die strategie kunnen ze rustig op hun buik schrijven. De oppositiepartijen gooien hun fractieleiders in de strijd, maar CDA en VVD laten het zware werk over aan hun secondanten. Bij de VVD is dat helemaal onbegrijpelijk, die in Mark Rutte één van de populairste premiers ooit op de bank laten zitten. En zelfs Geert Wilders, de beste campaigner van Nederland op dit moment, lijkt in aanloop naar de verkiezingen gas terug genomen te hebben.

Dit heeft een aantal belangrijke gevolgen voor de komende verkiezingen. Op de eerste plaats ontbreekt hierdoor de motivatie bij de kiezer om strategisch te stemmen, terwijl dat nu juist voor zowel de oppositie als coalitie partijen een cruciaal onderdeel van de pitch had moeten zijn. Omdat geen enkele partij één thema centraal heeft gesteld, en geen enkele partij het belang van een keuze voor linksom of rechtsom – toch de basis van iedere campagne – heeft benadrukt, kan de kiezer alle kanten op. En dat doet die dan ook. Waarom zou de kiezer niet voor de lol op 50+ of Partij voor de Dieren stemmen, omdat een aantal lijsttrekkers van grote partijen hun stem zo belangrijk vonden dat ze de week voor de verkiezingen nog even lekker op vakantie gingen?

Op de tweede plaats betekent het gebrek aan ‘campagnegeweld’ dat de opkomst voor de Provinciale Staten verkiezingen, die toch al nooit zo hoog was, wel eens dramatisch laag zou kunnen zijn. Want nogmaals: als de politieke partijen het niet belangrijk genoeg vinden om de kiezer een glasheldere keuze voor te schotelen, waarom zou de kiezer dan naar de stembus gaan?   

Verkiezingscampagnes moeten ergens over gaan, en ze moeten de kiezer een duidelijke keuze bieden. Hoe groter het belang dat is gediend bij die keuze, hoe groter de interesse en betrokkenheid van de kiezer. Het is de taak van de campagneorganisatie om die keuze te framen, en het belang te onderstrepen. Daar zijn alle campagneorganisaties dit jaar niet in geslaagd. En daarom kunnen ze de komende dagen net zo goed nog even lekker op vakantie gaan, want alles wat ze nu nog proberen is een druppel op de gloeiende plaat, en zal vanuit strategisch oogpunt de uitslag niet meer beinvloeden. Want wat je acht weken hebt laten liggen, kun je in één week niet meer rechttrekken.

 

In 1992, New York Times reporter Bill Carter wrote his terrific book 'The Late Shift: Letterman, Leno and the Network Battle for the Night', detailing the amazing behind the scenes Hollywood power struggle between NBC, CBS, Jay Leno and David Letterman for the right to succeed Johnny Carson as host of the Tonight Show. If anybody revealed that Hollywood is just like Alice in Wonderland, Bill Carter did. My personal highlight in that book was the improbably scene of Jay Leno hiding in a broom closet to listen in on a secret NBC conference call, and later using his knowledge of the call to tease various NBC executives. In the end, Jay Leno won that war, taking over the Tonight Show while David Letterman retreated to CBS to start his own show.

To be honest, I've always been a Letterman fan. I even appeared on his show in 1994 in a Valentine's Day sketch, where I got to throw a wedding cake out the window of the CBS studio that landed on the counter at Rupert's below. Despite my own, small (and messy) contribution, Jay Leno won the ratings war, and has outscored Letterman on most nights every season.

But even Bill Carter could hardly have imagined that history would repeat itself. In 2004, NBC announced that Jay Leno would be replaced by Conan O'Brien five years later, in 2009. Because Leno's ratings remained strong, NBC decided to do everything in it's power to keep him with the network, and eventually gave him a daily prime-time show at 10:00pm. Unfortunately, both Conan and Leno failed to deliver the audiences NBC had hoped for. In a desperate move, NBC then tried to put Leno back at 11:30, giving him a half-hour show, pushing O'Brien back to 12:00. In his famous letter to the 'people of the earth', Conan O'Brien turned down NBC's plot, paving the way for Leno to return to the Tonight Show. O'Brien later signed a deal with cable station TBS.

In other words, time for a sequel, and Bill Carter delivered with 'The war for late night: when Leno went early and television went crazy'. A delicious read, that makes you think at each turn of the page: 'what were these guys at NBC thinking?!?'. Two passages stand out though, and they're both in the epilogue. One is from Jerry Seinfeld, seemingly the only person in Hollywood to maintain his sanity:

"It's all fake! There's no institution to offend! All of this 'I won't sit by and watch the institution damaged.' What institution? Ripping off the public? That's the only institution! We tell jokes and they give us millions! Who's going to take over Late Night or Late Show or whatever the hell it's called? Nobody's going to take it over! It's Dave! When Dave's done, that's the end of that! And then another guy comes along and has to do his thing. That, to me, is an obvious essential of show business that you eventually grasp.... There are no shows! It's all made up! The TV show is just a card! Somebody printed the words on it!"

And the second passage, is the even better story told to 'Saturday Night Live' boss Lorne Michaels by his NBC boss Irwin Segelstein in 1979, when Michaels said he wanted to quit. You want to leave, Segelstein asked? Fine, this is what will happen:

"When you leave, the show will get worse. But not all of a sudden -- gradually. And it will take the audience a while to figure that out. Maybe two, maybe three years. And when it gets to be, you know, awful, and the audience has abandoned it, then we will cancel it. And the show will be gone, but we will still be here, because we're the network and we are eternal. If you read your contract closely, it says that the show is to be ninety minutes in length. It is to cost X. That's the budget. Nowhere in that do we ever say that it has to be good. And if you are so robotic and driven that you feel the pressure to push yourself in that way to make it good, don't come to us and say you've been treated unfairly, because you're trying hard to make it good and we're getting in your way. Because at no point did we ask for it to be good.... Our job is to lie, cheat, and steal -- and your job is to do the show."

Passages like these, and the fascinating insights into the Hollywood power struggles, make Bill Carter's second installment into the battle for late night a must read.

Images have a great impact in communications, and so do colors. Consider the latest infographic from KISSmetrics:

http://blog.kissmetrics.com/color-psychology/